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Using a two-moment decision model this paper analyzes corporate hedging behavior in the presence of uniﬁed and 
diﬀerential income taxation. We start with the well-known result that risk-taking may increase when income tax rates 
increase and, therefore, the incentive for hedging reduces. We demonstrate that pure hedging is diﬀerently aﬀected by 
taxation than speculative hedging is. Analysing tax-sensitivity of the corporate hedge shows that a higher risk in the 
ﬁrst place may reduce the tax-induced incentive to revise a futures position. 
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Our paper analyzes optimum corporate hedging by futures in the presence of
full loss-oﬀset income taxation. A two-moment decision model1 is presented
which is consistent with expected utility maximization in order to explicitly
derive the eﬀect of risk in the case of uniﬁed and diﬀerential taxation. The
optimal hedging strategy of the risk averse management is developed and
comparative statics are presented. In detail we ask the following questions:
What is the impact of taxation on corporate futures demand? Does a change
in risk and return aﬀect the magnitude of this impact?
The literature discusses many reasons explaining why corporate hedging
occurs. One line of argument points out that hedging is a tool to reduce
expected taxes, and hence increasing expected proﬁts.2 Furthermore, the
phenomenon that by introducing taxation risk-taking can be encouraged is
well-known in the literature.3 The aim of our investigation is to focus on
cross eﬀects, because bearing risk for tax reasons is not independent from
the incentive to take risks in the ﬁrst place. The same holds for the hedging
behavior. In addition, our note studies diﬀerential taxation of proﬁts from
corporate sales and proﬁts from corporate hedging activity.4
Our study proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the futures-hedging de-
1See, e.g., Schneeweiß, 1967, Sinn, 1980, Meyer, 1987, Battermann, Broll, and Wahl,
2002, and Broll, Wahl, and Wong, 2006.
2See Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993.
3See, e.g., Mossin, 1968, Bamberg and Richter, 1984, Sandmo, 1989, and Konrad and
Richter, 1995.
4See, e.g., Zilcha and Eldor, 2004. In reality, there exist diﬀerential taxation systems
in many countries, i.e., we observe diﬀerent tax rates for corporate income tax, personal
income tax, consumption tax, property and wealth taxes, etc. See OECD, 2001, 2007.3
cision problem and introduces a generalized form of Roy’s two-moment pref-
erence function which is representative for our purpose.5 Section 3 demon-
strates the relationship between income taxation and corporate futures-hedging
under uniﬁed and diﬀerential taxation of the return on sales and the gains
from hedge. Our paper concludes with some remarks.
2. The Decision Model
Consider a risk averse corporate management which seeks to hedge the risky
return ˜ r on sales s by selling futures contracts on ˜ r up to the amount h.T h e
futures rate is denoted by f.
The random corporate income is then given by
˜ y =˜ rs+( f − ˜ r)h. (1)
Expected income and the income’s variance follow from equation (1):
μ = E(˜ y)=E(˜ r)(s − h)+fh, (2)
σ
2 = V (˜ r)(s − h)
2, (3)
where E and V denote the expectation and variance operator, respectively.
From equations (2) and (3) we obtain the opportunity line. This line contains
the feasible combinations of μ and σ. The line is linear and its slope represents
the price of risk reduction:
μ = fs+
E(˜ r) − f
D(˜ r)
σ, (4)
where D represents the standard deviation operator.
5See Roy (1952).4
Corporate management maximizes a two-moment function V (μ,σ)w h i c h
exhibits convex indiﬀerence curves in (σ,μ)-space. Hence, the decision prob-
lem reads:
max
μ,σ V (μ,σ)( 5 )
subject to opportunity line (4).
Optimum hedging volume h∗ has to satisfy equality between the price
of risk reduction and the marginal rate of substition of income risk σ for
expected income μ:








We wish to focus our investigation on the case in which optimum hedging
volume can be explicitly solved and can also be separated additively in a
pure and a speculative part (see the hedging equation (8) below). A repre-
sentative preference function which is rational under normality regarding the
expected utility hypotheses and also satisﬁes the above mentioned separa-
bility is given by the generalized Roy function (Roy, 1952, and Schneeweiß,




1+ασ 2,α > 0. (7)
Remark: Pure and speculative parts in the hedge occur with preference func-
tions of the form V (μ,σ)=J(μ)/R(σ), given some weak conditions for the
functions J and R. The preference function (7) is representative for this
type of preference functions. The enumeration of all utility functions u(y)
implying the above form under the expected utility hypotheses and normal-
ity are given in Schneeweiß, 1967 (p. 154). In addition, Meyer, 1987 (p. 426,5
Property 6), reveals the importance of relative risk aversion regarding the
impact of proportional changes in μ and σ upon a general functional form of
the rate of substitition in equation (6) between the two parameters.
In what follows we further assume that the random return on sales is nor-
mally distributed with expected return μr and standard deviation of return
σr.
With the above preference function V the optimality condition (6) im-
plies:
h





Note that the full-hedge theorem holds.6 In the optimum futures contracts
have to cover pure hedge s and speculative hedge h∗ − s. The sign of the
risk premium (μr − f) determines whether or not we obtain a short or long
position in optimum speculative demand Δ∗ = s − h∗.
Furthermore, ∂ ln|Δ∗|/∂ lns = −1, that is to say, a given percentage
increase in sales reduces speculative demand for futures contracts by the same
percentage, when there is non-zero risk premium. Notice that the underlying
utility function exhibits increasing absolute and relative risk aversion in the
Arrow-Pratt sense for the relevant range of income, whereas the elasticity of
absolute risk aversion with respect to income is unity (Schneeweiß, 1967, p.
153).
6See, e.g., Wahl and Broll, 2006.6
3. Taxation and Hedging
In reality, corporate income is subject to taxation. What is the impact of tax-
ation on corporate futures-hedging? Does a change in risk and return aﬀect
the magnitude of this impact? In the following we analyze these questions
in detail.
3.1 Uniﬁed Taxation
Consider uniﬁed taxation of sales returns and futures returns. Let t denote
the income tax rate which is valid for both types of returns. Hence the ex-
pectation of after-tax income becomes (1−t)μ and the standard deviation of
after-tax income becomes (1 − t)σ. The given preference function (7) yield
the following marginal rate of substitution of after-tax income risk for after-
tax expected income: α(1 − t)2μσ/[1 + α(1 − t)2σ2].
Corporate Hedge
The optimality condition (6) adjusted for uniﬁed taxation requires the hedg-
ing policy to be:
h
∗







First, the full-hedge theorem holds. Second, optimum pure hedge is indepen-
dent of taxation, optimum speculative hedge has to be tax-adjusted, if there
is a risk premium. If there is no risk premium, uniﬁed taxation does not alter
optimum hedging volume, that is to say, h∗
t = h∗. Like under certainty the
full-hedge case neutralizes the impact of a uniﬁed taxation scheme because
marginal rate of substitution remains constant.7
Comparative Statics
Result 1 (Uniﬁed taxation and hedging) Speculative demand for futures
contracts, i.e., |s−h∗
t|, increases with the uniﬁed tax rate. Furthermore, the
tax-sensitivity of futures demand increases.
Proof Let Δt = s − ht denote tax-adjusted speculative demand for futures
contracts. From (9) it follows that ∂|Δ∗
t|/∂t > 0a n d∂2|Δ∗
t|/∂t2 > 0.
Intuition is well-known and runs as follows: Increasing the uniﬁed tax rate
reduces expected income but also reduces risk. Since the marginal rate of
substitution of risk for return reacts negatively to an increase in taxation and
the price of risk reduction is ﬁxed corporate management is willing to take
more risk, i.e. to decrease the hedge rate.
Result 2 (Tax-sensitivity and risk) The increase in the speculative demand
for futures contracts due to an increase in the uniﬁed tax rate lessens when
return on sales becomes more risky.
Proof From (9) we get ∂2|Δ∗
t|/∂t∂σr < 0.
Here, the following intuition holds: Increasing return risk holding expected
income constant makes speculative demand less tax-sensitive since higher
potential losses are less utility decreasing than higher potential gains are,
when taxation enhances. Note that we consider a full loss-oﬀset taxation
scheme.8
3.2 Diﬀerential Taxation
Let us now consider diﬀerential taxation of sales returns and futures returns.
Let ts and th denote the income tax rate for the return on sales and for the
gains from hedge, respectively. Hence the expected after-tax income with
diﬀerential taxation, μts,th, becomes μts,th = μr[(1 − ts)s − (1 − th)h]+( 1−
th)fh. The variance of the after-tax income, σ2
ts,th,r e a d sσ2
ts,th = σ2
r[(1 −
ts)s − (1 − th)h]2. Marginal rate of substitution of after-tax income risk for
after-tax expected income becomes: αμts,thσts,th/(1 + ασ2
ts,th).
Corporate Hedge














Note that there is no full-hedge theorem since sgn(μr −f)=s g n [ ( 1−ts)s−
(1 − th)h]  =s g n ( s − h). In contrast to the uniﬁed taxation scheme of equa-
tion (9) the full-hedge case does not neutralize the impact of taxation on
hedging. Furthermore, both tax rates have an impact on the pure as well as
the speculative part of the amount of hedging.
Comparative Statics
Result 3 (Diﬀerential taxation and hedging) Assume ts >t h.A ni n c r e a s e
in diﬀerential taxation, such that dts+dth = 0, implies that the tax-adjusted
speculative demand for futures contracts increases with the sales tax rate.
Proof Let Δts,th =( 1−ts)s−(1−th)h denote the tax-adjusted speculative9











(1 − ts)(1 − th)
Δ
∗,








(1 − ts)2(1 − th)2 |Δ
∗| > 0. (11)
Result 4 (Tax-sensitivity and risk) Assume ts >t h a n da ni n c r e a s ei n
diﬀerential taxation, such that dts + dth = 0. Then the increase in the tax-
adjusted speculative demand for futures contracts due to an increase in the
sales tax rate lessens when return on sales becomes more risky.
Proof From equation (11) we get ∂2|Δ∗
ts,th|(1 − th)−1/∂ts∂σr < 0.
Since the random return on sales is perfectly negatively correlated to the
random return of the hedge increasing diﬀerential taxation by increasing the
positive spread between sales and hedge tax rates allows to use the intu-
ition of the uniﬁed taxation case. Our condition dts + dth = 0 implies that
the changes in both tax rates cancel out in a way. It, therefore, provides a
straight investigation on the impact of diﬀerentiability in tax rates on corpo-
rate hedging volume and its tax sensitivity. In general, it is not the change
in tax rates per se what matters but it is the change in the spread of the tax
rates.
Another example that helps focussing on the tax rates’ spread is the case
of ts >t h = 0. If only corporate sales are taxed results 3 and 4 also hold:
∂|Δ∗
ts,th|/∂ts = |Δ∗|/(1 − ts)2 > 0a n d∂2|Δ∗
ts,th|/∂ts∂σr < 0. Hence, in-
creasing the tax rate of corporate sales holding corporate gains from hedge10
untaxed produces an incentive to increase the tax-adjusted speculative fu-
tures position and decreases tax-sensitivity to risk.
Finally, note that tax-sensitivity of corporate hedging regarding expected
return on sales is positive in both, the uniﬁed and diﬀerential taxation
scheme. Hence, a higher return works in favor of the well-known tax eﬀect
on the tax-adjusted speculative demand for futures contracts.
4. Concluding Remarks
We have analyzed a risk averse corporate management which hedges risky
return by selling futures contracts and which follows a generalized form of
the Roy preference function. With uniﬁed taxation the full-hedge theorem
holds. If the gains out of the hedge position are taxed diﬀerently than risky
operating returns the full-hedge theorem is violated.
Most importantly, pure hedge and speculative hedge, as a function of the
risk premium, have to be considered separately. A uniﬁed tax rate does not
alter pure hedge, but inﬂuences the speculative position. It increases with
the tax rate, where this increase lessens with risk. If tax rates diﬀer, then
the pure hedge as well as the speculative hedge depend upon both rates.
Suppose operating returns are taxed higher than hedge gains. Increas-
ing the tax diﬀerential makes hedging less attractive under full loss-oﬀset.
But tax-sensitivity depends upon risk. The higher the riskiness of operating
returns the smaller tax-sensitivity.11
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